A Military Response to a Warming World: Federalism, Militias, and Catastrophic Disasters by Olson, Samantha
20. Olson SAE Final Review (Do Not Delete) 4/23/2019 4:14 PM 
 
301 
A MILITARY RESPONSE TO A WARMING 
WORLD: FEDERALISM, MILITIAS, AND 
CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS 
SAMANTHA OLSON* 
‘‘It’s a question, once again, of being forward deployed, forward 
engaged, and be in a position to respond to the kinds of natural disasters 
that I think we see as a second or third order effect of climate change.’’  
– Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford1 
INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is a threat to national security, a threat that the 
United States Department of Defense has explicitly recognized. In 
addition to exacerbating conflicts overseas, climate change threatens 
American lives through violent storms, wildfires, floods, droughts, and 
other natural disasters. The United States Armed Forces and the 
National Guard are called upon to both defend American interests 
abroad and to protect Americans from disaster at home. Some states 
also call on their State Defense Forces—military forces controlled and 
funded by individual states—to respond to natural disasters. While 
Federal and state military forces both play a significant role in disaster 
response, Federal military forces and federalized National Guard are 
prohibited from functioning as law enforcement in these scenarios 
under the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). State Defense Forces and state-
controlled National Guard are not subject to the PCA. 
This restriction generally does not impede the function of these 
military forces in disaster response, and Presidential invocation of the 
Insurrection Act may even override this restriction in extreme 
situations. However, federalism concerns and questions regarding the 
appropriate use of the Insurrection Act likely slowed the federal 
military response to Hurricane Katrina, adding further confusion to an 
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 1.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91 § 335, 131 
Stat. 1283, 1357 (2017), https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ91/PLAW-115publ91.pdf 
[hereinafter National Defense Authorization Act 2018]. 
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already chaotic situation. As a result of ongoing climate change and 
warming oceans, hurricanes are likely increasing in severity and 
threatening greater swaths of the coast. These changes could 
potentially result in more catastrophic natural disasters similar to 
Hurricane Katrina. 
This note draws on earlier scholarship concerning the Insurrection 
Act and federalism in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and incorporates 
new information regarding the impacts of climate change on natural 
disasters in the United States. In light of intensifying hurricanes, 
flooding, and other extreme weather events, this note argues for 
clarifying when and how federal military forces and federalized 
National Guard may be used to respond to natural disasters. This note 
argues for an amended Insurrection Act that provides the President 
greater flexibility to respond quickly to catastrophic natural disasters 
and clarifies when it can be invoked. This note also argues for the 
expansion of state capabilities for disaster response through the use of 
State Defense Forces as a way for states to better prepare for 
increasingly severe weather events and avoid the need for Federal 
intervention through the Insurrection Act. 
Part I of this note will discuss the threat of climate change and the 
Department of Defense’s response. Parts II and III of this note will 
address the statutory background of disaster response and the use of 
the military domestically. Part IV will cover the relevant military forces 
responsible for disaster response. Part V will examine two hurricane 
scenarios and how they offer insight into effective preparedness and 
response to increasingly severe weather events. Finally, Part VI will 
offer potential statutory and policy changes to better address the 
growing threat of natural disasters. 
I. CLIMATE CHANGE AS A NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT 
Climate change poses a significant threat to the United States by 
exacerbating the impact of extreme weather events.2 Because of these 
domestic impacts and climate change’s effects on stability across the 
globe, the United States Department of Defense has explicitly 
recognized it as a threat to national security since 2010.3 The United 
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has 
 
 2.  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 69 (Rajendra K.  Pachauri et al. eds. 2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessme 
nt-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_All_Topics.pdf [hereinafter IPCC 2014 SYNTHESIS 
REPORT]. 
 3.  See infra Part I.B. 
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stated that “[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since 
the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over 
decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the 
amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level has risen.”4 
The 2014 report also concluded with “very high confidence” that “[i]n 
urban areas, climate change is projected to increase risks . . . from heat 
stress, storms and extreme precipitation, inland and coastal flooding, 
landslides, air pollution, drought, water scarcity, sea level rise and 
storm surges.”5 Although the IPCC report could not determine 
hurricane trends because of “observational limitations,” the IPCC 
concluded that “it is virtually certain that intense tropical cyclone 
activity has increased in the North Atlantic since 1970.”6 
Climate change worsens many weather events, but hurricanes and 
their associated events, such as storm surges, pose particularly 
significant threats to the United States.7 Hurricanes strike some of the 
most populous regions in the country and threaten critical 
infrastructure, such as power plants, ports, and military bases.8 Unlike 
other extreme weather events, they also frequently require a significant 
military response to assist with disaster relief.9 The following sections 
will review the impacts of climate change on security, both abroad and 
at home, focusing on the unique threat of natural disasters in the 
United States, followed by a discussion on the military’s affirmation of 
climate change and recognition of it as a threat to national security. 
 
 4.  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: 
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2 (2014), https://archive.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/syr/ 
AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf [hereinafter IPCC 2014 SUMMARY]. 
 5.  IPCC 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2. 
 6.  Id. at 53. 
 7.  See infra Part I.A. 
 8.  See infra Part I.A. 
 9.  See CTR. FOR LAW & MILITARY OPERATIONS (CLAMO), DOMESTIC DISASTER 
RESPONSE 2017 HURRICANES HARVEY, IRMA, AND MARIA: LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE 
ADVOCATES  8 (2018), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Domestic-Disaster-
Response_%202017.pdf [hereinafter CLAMO DOMESTIC DISASTER RESPONSE] (noting that the 
2017 hurricane season saw the activation of more than 50,000 members of the National Guard). 
While other extreme weather events, such as floods and wildfires, also require activating the 
National Guard for support, the response is usually not as extensive as that of hurricanes. See Jim 
Garamone, DEP’T OF DEF., Guardsmen Bring Combat Skills to Fighting Western Fires, (Aug. 16, 
2018) https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1604180/guardsmen-bring-combat-skills-to-
fighting-western-fires/ (noting that “1,000 California National Guardsmen have been called up to 
assist in the firefighting effort”). 
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A. Climate Change: A Threat at Home and Abroad 
Climate change affects the entire globe and is likely to impact food 
and water security, severely damage infrastructure, and even submerge 
some sovereign nations under rising seas.10 The IPCC noted that 
“[c]limate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflict by 
amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts, such as poverty 
and economic shocks.”11 Former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army 
Gordon Sullivan echoed this concern stating, ‘‘[C]limate change is a 
national security issue . . . climate instability will lead to instability in 
geopolitics and impact American military operations around the 
world.”12 
While climate impacts are likely to exacerbate conflicts around the 
world, climate change also poses increased threats to Americans. 
According to the IPCC, the United States is threatened by three key 
risks: 
1) “[w]ildfire-induced loss of ecosystem integrity, property loss, 
human morbidity, and mortality as a result of increased drying 
trend and temperature trend;”13 
2) “heat-related human mortality;”14 and 
3) “[u]rban floods in riverine and coastal areas, inducing 
property and infrastructure damage; supply chain, ecosystem, 
and social system disruption; public health impacts; and water 
quality impairment, due to sea level rise, extreme 
precipitation, and cyclones.”15 
In November 2018 alone, two fires devastated California and 
claimed 89 lives.16 Two major hurricanes also wrought havoc on the 
 
 10.  See Nathanial Gronewold, Island Nations May Keep Some Sovereignty if Rising Seas 
Make Them Uninhabitable, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2011), https://archive.nytimes.com/www. 
nytimes.com/cwire/2011/05/25/25climatewire-island-nations-may-keep-some-sovereignty-if-
63590.html?pagewanted=all. 
 11.  IPCC 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 73. 
 12.  National Defense Authorization Act 2018, supra note 1. 
 13.  Patricia Romero-Lankao et al., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 1477 (2014), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Ashley McBride, Camp Fire: Death Toll Rises to 86 After Hospitalized Man Dies from 
Burn Injuries, S.F. CHRONICLE  (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/california-
wildfires/article/Camp-Fire-Death-toll-rises-to-86-after-13458956.php; Gabby Ferreira, Woolsey 
Fire Death Toll Rises to 3 After Body is Found in Burned-Out Home, SAN LUIS OBISPO 
TRIBUNE (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.sanluisobispo.com/news/state/california/fires/article 
221654060.html. 
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southeastern United States in the fall of 2018, resulting in over 90 
deaths and billions of dollars in damage.17 In addition to wildfires and 
hurricanes, other extreme weather events are also increasing in 
frequency or severity. The number of tornadoes occurring in 
southeastern states is increasing;18 severe floods are likely to increase 
in frequency; and western states are more likely to experience longer 
periods of drought.19 
Although it is impossible to directly link any single natural disaster 
to climate change, general trends in extreme weather events in recent 
years can be attributed to rising global surface temperatures.20 Recent 
studies have found that climate change intensified the rainfall of 
Hurricanes Katrina, Irma, and Maria by between four and nine 
percent21 and that climate change “likely resulted in a ~20% increase” 
in Hurricane Harvey’s accumulated precipitation.22 Other research has 
linked climate change to an overall decrease in tropical storms and 
 
 17.  Doyle Rice, Monsters Florence and Michael Powered the Deadly, Destructive Atlantic 
Hurricane Season that Ends Friday, USA TODAY (Nov. 29, 2018, 1:25PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/11/29/hurricane-season-ends-florence-and-
michael-left-death-destruction/2148341002/; Leslie Scism & Erin Ailworth, Moody’s Pegs 
Florence’s Economic Cost at $38 Billion to $50 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2018, 7:22PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/moodys-pegs-florences-economic-cost-at-38-billion-to-50-billion-
1537572161. 
 18.  Vittorio A. Gensini & Harold E. Brooks, Spatial Trends in United States Tornado 
frequency, 38 CLIMATE & ATMOSPHERIC SCI. 1, 1 (2018). 
 19. See THOMAS JOHNSON ET AL., IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 150 (D.R. Reidmiller et al. eds. 2018) 
(summarizing how various regions of the United States will be impacted by floods or droughts); 
see also PATRICK GONZALEZ ET AL., IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 1112 (D.R. Reidmiller et al. eds. 2018) 
(“With continued greenhouse gas emissions, higher temperatures would cause more frequent and 
severe droughts in the Southwest.”). 
 20.  “Climate” is the average weather conditions over a long period of time, usually 30 years 
or more. “Climate change” generally refers to changes in the average weather conditions, such as 
average high and low temperatures and precipitation. For example, Hurricane Irma was a singular 
weather event. Climate change did not cause Hurricane Irma, but climate change—particularly 
increases in the average temperature of the ocean—could increase the intensity and frequency of 
hurricanes in general. Thus, climate change enhances the conditions that can lead to natural 
disasters, like hurricanes and wildfires. See Christina M. Patricola & Michael F. Wehner, 
Anthropogenic Influences on Major Tropical Cyclone Events, 563 NATURE 339, 339 (2018) (“Sea-
surface temperature (SST) warming has been observed and is expected to continue, which would 
intensify tropical cyclones.”). 
  21. Id. at 345. 
 22.  S-Y Simon Wang et al., Quantitative Attribution of Climate Effects on Hurricane 
Harvey’s Extreme Rainfall in Texas, 13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 8 (2018). 
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hurricanes but an increase in the intensity of hurricanes.23 
Alternatively, recent models have also predicted an increase in the 
frequency, intensity, and intensification distribution of hurricanes over 
the next century.24 
While scientists continue to study and debate the impact of climate 
change on hurricanes, one thing is certain: people continue moving to 
and developing hurricane-prone areas along the Atlantic and Gulf 
Coasts. In 2016, approximately 94 million people lived directly adjacent 
to the coast.25 Of that 94 million, approximately 59.6 million lived in 
the Atlantic and Gulf Coast regions, up from 51.9 million in 2000.26 
Major coastal cities at risk of hurricanes, flooding, and sea level rise 
include Miami, Tampa, Jacksonville, Houston, Washington, D.C., and 
even New York City.27 
While climate change threatens ever greater numbers of 
Americans as they move to vulnerable coastal cities, it also poses a 
serious threat to infrastructure. Hurricanes threaten nuclear power 
plants, military installations, and major ports with inundation, in 
addition to hundreds of billions of dollars in commercial and 
residential real estate.28 Over time the impacts of rising sea levels, 
combined with storm surges from hurricanes, will threaten greater and 
greater swaths of the coastal United States.29 
B. The U.S. Military as a Climate Change Affirmer 
The Department of Defense (DoD) recognizes climate change as 
a national security threat and is actively addressing climate-related 
vulnerabilities to military infrastructure across the globe.30 The military 
 
 23.  Thomas R. Knutson et al., Dynamical Downscaling Projections of Twenty-First-Century 
Atlantic Hurricane Activity: CMIP3 and CMIP5 Model-Based Scenarios, 26 J. CLIMATE 6591, 6616 
(2013). 
 24.  Kieran Bhatia et al., Projected Response of Tropical Cyclone Intensity and Intensification 
in a Global Climate Model, 31 J. CLIMATE 8281, 8295, 8297 (2018). 
 25.  Darryl T. Cohen, 60 Million Live in the Path of Hurricanes, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 
6, 2018), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/08/coastal-county-population-rises.html. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  See, e.g., Romero-Lankao et al., supra note 13, at 1474 (discussing climate responses in 
New York City). 
 28.  See Krishna Rao, Climate Change and Housing: Will a Rising Tide Sink All Homes?, 
ZILLOW RESEARCH (June 2, 2017), https://www.zillow.com/research/climate-change-
underwater-homes-12890/ (“Nationwide, almost 1.9 million homes (or roughly 2 percent of all 
U.S. homes)—worth a combined $882 billion—are at risk of being underwater by 2100.”). 
 29.  See generally Romero-Lankao et al., supra note 13. 
 30.  See DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON EFFECTS OF A CHANGING CLIMATE TO THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (2019), https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/29/2002084200/-1/-
1/1/CLIMATE-CHANGE-REPORT-2019.PDF [hereinafter 2019 DOD CLIMATE CHANGE 
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has been aware of the threat posed by climate change since at least 
1990;31 however, DoD did not seriously consider climate change until 
the CNA Corporation and 11 retired military officers released a report 
in 2007 addressing climate change as a national security threat.32 The 
report found that climate change posed a threat to national security by 
affecting extreme weather events and increasing tensions in both 
unstable and stable portions of the world.33 It also noted that climate 
change has the “potential to create sustained natural and humanitarian 
disasters on a scale far beyond those we see today” and provided 
recommendations to address these risks, such as incorporating climate 
change into national security strategies and working with developing 
countries to increase resiliency and capacity to respond to climate 
impacts.34 
Following the CNA Military Advisory Report, DoD recognized 
the need to address climate change as a security threat in its 2008 
National Defense Strategy.35 However, DoD did not explicitly draw the 
link between climate change and national security until the 2010 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR Report), a legislatively-
mandated review of DoD’s national security strategies.36 The QDR 
Report stated, “Climate change will affect DoD in two broad ways. 
First, climate change will shape the operating environment, roles, and 
 
REPORT]; see generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-206, CLIMATE CHANGE 
ADAPTATION: DOD NEEDS TO BETTER INCORPORATE ADAPTATION INTO PLANNING AND 
COLLABORATION AT OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS (2017); CURT D. STORLAZZI ET AL., RC-2334, 
THE IMPACT OF SEA-LEVEL RISE AND CLIMATE CHANGE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
INSTALLATIONS ON ATOLLS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN (2017). 
 31.  See generally Terry P. Kelley, Global Climate Change Implications for the United States 
Navy (unpublished research, Naval War College) (available via FOIA request at 
http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/weather/climatechange/globalclimatechange-
navy.pdf) (“Global climate change poses a multifaceted challenge to the Navy over the next half-
century. This challenge will impact naval operations, facilities, and systems, and affect resource 
allocations.”). 
 32.  CNA CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (2007), 
https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/national%20security%20and%20the%20threat%20of%20cli
mate%20change.pdf. 
 33.  Id. at 6–7. 
 34.  Id. at 6; id. at 7–8. 
 35.  See DEP’T OF DEF., NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY 4 (2008), 
http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2008NationalDefenseStrategy.pdf (“Over the next twenty years 
physical pressures—population, resource, energy, climatic and environmental—could combine 
with rapid social, cultural, technological and geopolitical change to create greater uncertainty.”). 
 36.  See 10 U.S.C. § 118(a) (2012) (repealed by National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. 97-295, § 941(b)(1), 130 Stat. 2000, 2367) (“The Secretary of Defense 
shall every four years . . . conduct a comprehensive examination . . . of the national defense 
strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other 
elements of the defense program and policies of the United States.”). 
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missions that we undertake. . . . Second, DoD will need to adjust to the 
impacts of climate change on our facilities and military capabilities.”37 
DoD continues to recognize the need for the military in disaster 
response, noting “extreme weather events may lead to increased 
demands for defense support to civil authorities for humanitarian 
assistance or disaster response both within the United States and 
Overseas.”38 The DoD 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap 
took an even more aggressive stance on climate change: 
A changing climate will have real impacts on our military and the 
way it executes its missions. The military could be called upon more 
often to support civil authorities, and provide humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief in the face of more frequent and more 
intense natural disasters. Our coastal installations are vulnerable to 
rising sea levels and increased flooding, while droughts, wildfires, 
and more extreme temperatures could threaten many of our training 
activities. Our supply chains could be impacted, and we will need to 
ensure our critical equipment works under more extreme weather 
conditions. Weather has always affected military operations, and as 
the climate changes, the way we execute operations may be altered 
or constrained.39 
Despite the Trump Administration dropping climate change from 
the National Security Strategy issued in 2017,40 DoD continues to treat 
it as a national security risk and has published several reports on the 
U.S. military’s vulnerabilities since recognizing climate change as a 
security threat in 2008.41 The latest report from January 2019 studied 
 
 37.  DEP’T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 84–85 (2010), 
http://archive.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2029JAN10%201600.pdf. 
 38.  Id. at 85. 
 39.  Chuck Hagel, Foreword to DEP’T OF DEF., 2014 CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
ROADMAP (2014), https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/downloads/CCARprint_wForward_e.pdf. 
 40.  Compare WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (only 
referring to “climate policies” in regards to energy dominance), with WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL 
SECURITY STRATEGY 12 (2015), http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf 
(listing climate change as one of the major threats to national security). The Obama 
Administration’s National Security Strategy goes on to state that: 
Climate change is an urgent and growing threat to our national security, contributing to 
increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources like food and 
water. The present day effects of climate change are being felt from the Arctic to the 
Midwest. Increased sea levels and storm surges threaten coastal regions, infrastructure, and 
property. In turn, the global economy suffers, compounding the growing costs of preparing 
and restoring infrastructure. 
WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 12 (2015). 
 41.  See, e.g., 2019 DOD CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT, supra note 30; see, e.g., OFFICE OF THE 
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS, DEP’T OF DEF., 
CLIMATE-RELATED RISK TO DOD INFRASTRUCTURE INITIAL VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
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the impacts of five “climate-related events”—recurrent flooding, 
drought, desertification, wildfires, and thawing permafrost—on 
seventy-nine military installations.42 The report found that “[a]bout 
two-thirds of the 79 installations addressed . . . are vulnerable to 
current or future recurrent flooding” and provided recommendations 
for improving DoD’s research and resiliency.43 Over the last ten years, 
climate change has become a serious consideration for the U.S. military 
as a national security threat and will likely continue to be treated as 
such in the future.44 
Some scholars have expressed concerns over DoD’s inclusion of 
nontraditional risks, like climate change, within the national security 
framework.45 After the end of the Cold War, DoD adopted a broader 
view of national security threats incorporating “anything that presented 
a potential harm to the United States.”46 Historically, national security 
was concerned with protecting the Union and American sovereignty 
from hostile foreign nations or organizations.47 Perhaps, some argue, 
the military should withdraw from its involvement in climate change 
and disaster relief and leave such tasks to specialized agencies. In the 
words of Justice Black, “It is the primary business of armies and navies 
to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.”48 
On the other hand, the military is uniquely positioned to legitimize 
climate change concerns. Americans consistently give the military the 
highest confidence rating of any American institution.49 While more 
Republicans have acknowledged climate change in recent years, there 
 
SURVEY REPORT (2018), https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/tab-b-slvas-
report-1-24-2018.pdf; DEP’T OF THE NAVY, U.S. NAVY CLIMATE CHANGE ROADMAP (2010), 
https://www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/ccr.pdf; STORLAZZI ET AL., supra note 30. 
 42.  2019 DOD CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT, supra note 30, at 4. 
 43.  Id. at 16. 
 44.  See, e.g. id. at 2 (“DoD must be able to adapt current and future operations to address 
the impacts of a variety of threats and conditions, including those from weather and natural 
events.”) (emphasis added). 
 45.  See Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573, 
1715 (noting that categorizing climate change as a national security threat allows the military to 
acquire more resources and may remove the dialogue around climate change solutions from open, 
public discourse). 
 46.  Id. at 1708 (emphasis in original). 
 47.  Id. at 1576. 
 48.  United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). 
 49.  Frank Newport, U.S. Confidence in Military Reflects Perceived Competency, GALLUP 
(July 27, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/214511/high-confidence-military-reflects-perceived-
competency.aspx. 
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is still a wide gap between Democrats’ and Republicans’ views.50 Given 
Republicans tend to view the military more positively than Democrats, 
the military’s position may shift Republican’s perceptions of climate 
change.51 The military has also been a “norm leader in arenas such as 
the racial integration of American society, and the importance of 
patriotic values in encouraging civilian recycling during World War II, 
among others.”52 Actions taken by the military, like utilizing renewable 
energy and assessing climate risks to infrastructure, legitimize the risks 
of climate change and set a positive precedent for other agencies and 
citizens.53 
Regardless of the proper role of DoD in recognizing climate 
change as a national security threat, the military forces play an 
important role in disaster response and will continue to do so for the 
foreseeable future. The 2017 hurricane season was the costliest, as well 
as one of the deadliest, on record.54 The hurricane response “involved 
43 States and resulted in the activation of more than 50,000 members 
of the National Guard.”55 It required a massive mobilization effort on 
the part of local, state, and Federal governments, including active-duty 
troops, the National Guard, and State Defense Forces. 
II. U.S. DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY  
Disaster management requires a coordinated effort across local, 
state, tribal, and federal governments, NGOs, and private businesses. 
Disaster management and response in the United States “takes a 
 
 50.  Climate Concerns Increase; Most Republicans Now Acknowledge Change, MONMOUTH 
UNIV. POLLING INST., (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-institute/documents/ 
monmouthpoll_us_112918.pdf/; see also Cary Funk & Meg Hefferon, Many Republican 
Millennials Differ With Older Party Members on Climate Change and Energy Issues, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (May 14, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/14/many-
republican-millennials-differ-with-older-party-members-on-climate-change-and-energy-issues/ 
(“About a third (36%) of Millennials in the GOP say the Earth is warming mostly due to human 
activity, double the share of Republicans in the Baby Boomer or older generations.”). 
 51.  See Jim Norman, Americans Give Military Branches Similar High Marks, GALLUP (May 
26, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/211112/americans-give-military-branches-similar-high-
marks.aspx (“The biggest gaps in favorable opinion [of the military] are between Republicans and 
Democrats.”). 
 52.  Sarah E. Light, Valuing National Security: Climate Change, the Military, and Society, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 1772, 1776 (2014). 
 53.  See generally id. 
 54.  Doyle Rice, 2017’s Three Monster Hurricanes — Harvey, Irma and Maria — Among Five 
Costliest Ever, USA TODAY (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/ 
2018/01/30/2017-s-three-monster-hurricanes-harvey-irma-and-maria-among-five-costliest-
ever/1078930001/. 
 55.  CLAMO DOMESTIC DISASTER RESPONSE, supra note 9. 
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‘bottom up’ approach”, with initial responsibility falling on local 
governments, emergency responders, and volunteer groups.56 If local 
personnel are overwhelmed, state or tribal governments usually step in 
to bolster local efforts; when necessary, the state governor will issue a 
state disaster or emergency declaration. In most instances, the federal 
government will only step in when state and local resources are 
overwhelmed.57 The Stafford Act provides the statutory authority and 
framework for federal disaster response. Section 101 of the Stafford 
Act states that: 
The Congress hereby finds and declares that (1) because disasters 
often cause loss of life, human suffering, loss of income, and property 
loss and damage; and (2) because disasters often disrupt the normal 
functioning of governments and communities, and adversely affect 
individuals and families with great severity; special measures, 
designed to assist the efforts of the affected States in expediting the 
rendering of aid, assistance, and emergency services, and the 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of devastated areas, are 
necessary.58 
Congress intended “to provide an orderly and continuing means 
of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local 
governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the 
suffering and damage which result from such disasters.”59 Even when a 
state or tribal government requests aid, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) and other federal agencies 
“supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local 
governments, and disaster relief organizations” and only take control 
of management in extraordinary situations.60 
Upon request of the governor or the Chief Executive of a tribal 
government for assistance, the President may declare that a major 
disaster or emergency exists in the affected area.61  However, the type 
 
 56.  JARED T. BROWN & BRUCE R. LINDSAY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41981, 
CONGRESSIONAL PRIMER ON RESPONDING TO MAJOR DISASTERS AND EMERGENCIES 1 (2018). 
 57.  See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act § 401, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 5170 (2018) (“All requests for a declaration by the President that a major disaster exists . . . shall 
be based on a finding that the disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is 
beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that Federal assistance 
is necessary.”). 
 58.  42 U.S.C. § 5121(a) (2018). 
 59.  42 U.S.C. § 5121(b). 
 60.  42 U.S.C. §5122(2) (2018); see also BROWN & LINDSAY, supra note 56 (“[E]xcept in the 
most extraordinary circumstances, local and state/tribal governments are in charge of the disaster 
response.”). 
 61.  42 U.S.C. § 5170; 42 U.S.C. § 5191 (2018). “Emergency” is defined as: 
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of declaration impacts the assistance a state receives. An emergency 
declaration can occur “in advance or anticipation of the imminent 
impact of an incident that threaten such destruction as could result in 
a major disaster,”62 but it is more limited in scope than major disaster 
declarations and is intended for short-term situations. Major disaster 
declarations, on the other hand, can trigger a wide variety of Federal 
recovery programs, many focused on the long-term recovery of 
individuals and the community, in the wake of disaster.63 
The DoD is one of the Federal agencies called into action by the 
Stafford Act. The Act provides a general rule for “utilization of DoD 
resources”: 
During the immediate aftermath of an incident which may ultimately 
qualify for assistance under . . . this Act, the Governor of the State 
in which such incident occurred may request the President to direct 
the Secretary of Defense to utilize the resources of the Department 
of Defense for the purpose of performing on public and private lands 
any emergency work which is made necessary by such incident and 
which is essential for the preservation of life and property. If the 
President determines that such work is essential for the preservation 
of life and property, the President shall grant such request to the 
extent the President determines practicable. Such emergency work 
may only be carried out for a period not to exceed 10 days.64 
 
[A]ny occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal 
assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and 
to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a 
catastrophe in any part of the United States.  
42 U.S.C. § 5122(1). “Major disaster” is defined as: 
[A]ny natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, winddriven 
water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, 
or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United 
States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and 
magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts 
and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in 
alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.  
42 U.S.C. § 5122(2). 
 62.  The Disaster Declaration Process, FEMA, (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.fema.gov/disaster-
declaration-process; see also 42 U.S.C. § 5192(c) (2018) (“The President shall promulgate and 
maintain guidelines to assist Governors in requesting the declaration of an emergency in advance 
of a natural or man-made disaster (including for the purpose of seeking assistance with special 
needs and other evacuation efforts) under this section by defining the types of assistance available 
to affected States and the circumstances under which such requests are likely to be approved.”). 
 63.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5174 (2018) (Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households); 
42 U.S.C. § 5177 (2018) (Unemployment Assistance); 42 U.S.C. § 5182 (2018) (Legal Services); 
42 U.S.C. § 5183 (2018) (Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training); 42 U.S.C. § 5184 (2018) 
(Community Disaster Loans). 
 64.  42 U.S.C. § 5170b (2018). 
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In addition to the Stafford Act, the National Response 
Framework (NRF) and DoD directives outline the various roles and 
responsibilities of the military’s federal disaster response.65 The NRF 
mobilizes all levels of disaster response, from local faith groups to 
federal departments, and serves as a “guide to how the Nation 
responds to all types of disasters and emergencies.”66 The DoD 
Directive on Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) provides 
guidance on how federal military forces can respond to emergencies 
and, in particular, outlines when they can quell civil disturbances.67 
In response to natural disasters, the military can quickly provide 
disciplined personnel, expertise, and equipment to aid relief efforts. 
The federal government and many states organize their disaster 
response according to fifteen Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), 
such as “Transportation” and “Communications,” that outline which 
agencies take a lead role and which act in support.68 The NRF assigns 
lead agencies and support agencies to the ESFs depending on the 
agencies’ specific capabilities. For example, the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) is the lead agency for the Transportation ESF 
because DOT has the expertise and capability to maintain critical 
transportation systems and infrastructure during an emergency. Of the 
fifteen ESFs, the NRF designates DoD and the Army Corps of 
Engineers as the lead coordinating agencies for the Public Works and 
Engineering ESF, respectively.69  
On the state level, the National Guard plays a similar role to DoD. 
For example, Washington State organizes its disaster response 
according to ESFs like the NRF.70 There, the Adjutant General both 
commands all Washington Army and Air National Guard forces and 
 
 65.  See generally DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK i (3d ed. 
2016) [hereinafter NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK]; DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 3025.18, DEFENSE 
SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (Dec. 29, 2010), http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents 
/DD/issuances/dodd/302518p.pdf?ver=2018-03-19-093120-683 [hereinafter DSCA]. 
 66.  NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, supra note 65. 
 67.  See generally DSCA, supra note 65. 
 68.  NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, supra note 65, at 33. The Framework provides 
fifteen ESFs: Transportation; Communications; Public Works and Engineering; Firefighting; 
Information and Planning; Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human 
Services; Logistics; Public Health and Medical Services; Search and Rescue; Oil and Hazardous 
Materials Response; Agriculture and Natural Resources; Energy; Public Safety and Security; 
Long-term Community Recovery (superseded by National Disaster Recovery Framework); and 
External Affairs. Id. at 34–37. 
 69.  Id. at 34. 
 70.  See generally WASH. MILITARY DEP’T EMERGENCY MGMT. DIV., COMPREHENSIVE 
EMERGENCY MGMT. PLAN 84 (2016), https://mil.wa.gov/uploads/pdf/PLANS/final-wacemp-
basic-plan-june2016-signed.pdf. 
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serves as Director of the State’s Emergency Management and 
Enhanced 911 programs.71 The Washington Military Department 
Emergency Management Division serves as the coordinating agency 
for three ESFs, while the Washington Military Department’s National 
Guard serves as the lead coordinating agency for one ESF and serves 
as a supporting agency for eleven others.72 
The National Guard and federal military forces are well-equipped 
to provide support for transportation, communication, and search and 
rescue, among other functions. Many National Guard units have access 
to “wheeled vehicles capable of traversing varied terrain” including 
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs).73 Some 
Army National Guard units are also capable of providing aviation 
support, like utility helicopters and light fixed-wing aircraft.74 National 
Guard armories also have important communication abilities—they 
“operate[] high-frequency (HF) radios for long-range communication 
and ultra high-frequency (UHF) and very high-frequency radios 
(VHF) for short-range coordination of field activities.”75 Hurricane 
Katrina exposed gaps in communication to which the Army has 
responded by developing “high-tech capabilities that enable rapid, 
inter-agency communications during an emergency.”76 One of these is 
Joint Incident Site Communications Capability which includes 
communication vehicles equipped with radio and satellite 
communications and Internet capabilities to establish remote 
command posts.77 These capabilities are essential when traditional 
communication systems are overwhelmed or inoperable following a 
natural disaster. While the military’s support capabilities are 
“generally derived from DoD warfighting capabilities,”78 many of the 
 
 71.  The Adjutant General, Washington, WASH. MILITARY DEP’T., https://mil.wa.gov/about-
us/the-adjutant-general (last visited Dec. 12, 2018). 
 72.  Id. at 84. 
 73.  James Stuhltrager, Send in the Guard: The National Guard Response to Natural 
Disasters, 20 NAT. RESOURCE & ENV’T 21, 22 (2006). 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 23. 
 76. Claire Heininger, Army Provides Mobile Satellite Communications for Disaster Response, 
U.S. ARMY (Jan. 24, 2011), https://www.army.mil/article/50731/army_provides_mobile_satellite_ 
communications_for_disaster_response. 
 77.  Id.; see also Stuhltrager, supra note 73, at 23 (“Some states – such as Florida, 
Pennsylvania, and Texas – are equipped with the Interim SATCOM Incident Site Command Set 
(ISISCS), which provides a comprehensive suite of satellite communication, Internet, video 
conference, and radio/phone interoperability.”). 
 78.  JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-28, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES 
I-3 (2018). 
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same capabilities necessary on the battlefield have useful domestic 
applications as well. 
III. THE USE OF THE MILITARY IN DOMESTIC ARENAS 
The role of the U.S. military in ordinary, domestic affairs is 
extremely limited and regulated. Military forces—active duty troops, 
the National Guard, and State Defense Forces—can be relied upon for 
disaster support; however, the abilities of federal military forces are 
more limited than those of the National Guard or State Defense 
Forces. Under the Posse Comitatus Act, federal troops cannot be used 
for any domestic law enforcement activities without Congressional 
authorization.79 State-controlled troops such as the National Guard or 
a State Defense Force, are not subject to the restrictions of the Posse 
Comitatus Act and can enforce laws.80 In extraordinary circumstances, 
such as those under the Insurrection Act, federal military forces may 
be utilized to enforce laws;81 however, such circumstances rarely arise. 
Following a natural disaster, both federal and state troops can 
assist with recovery efforts such as maintaining communication lines or 
performing search and rescue missions. In most natural disaster 
scenarios, the Posse Comitatus Act does not restrict the military’s 
capabilities in any meaningful way because governors can rely on their 
own National Guard units and those of neighboring states to respond 
without relying heavily on federal military forces. However, the events 
of Hurricane Katrina provide an insightful example into how these 
Acts may hinder disaster response.82 As hurricanes become 
increasingly severe and threaten significant portions of the Atlantic 
and Gulf Coasts as a result of climate change, the Posse Comitatus Act 
and inflexibility of the Insurrection Act may inhibit the ability of the 
President to respond quickly and effectively to catastrophic natural 
disasters. 
A. The Posse Comitatus Act 
The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) reflects the deeply held 
American fear of military intrusion into domestic affairs. King 
George’s use of soldiers to control and suppress unruly colonists 
“affronted the English tradition against domestic use of military 
 
 79.  18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2018). 
 80.  See id. (applying to the Army and Air Force); see also infra Part IV. 
 81.  10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55 (2018). 
 82.  See infra Part V. 
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troops” and was a catalyst for the American Revolution.83 The 
Declaration of Independence lists King George’s “[keeping] among us, 
in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our 
legislatures” and “render[ing] the Military independent of and superior 
to the Civil Power” as examples of the English Crown’s “repeated 
injuries and usurpations.”84 The Founding Fathers reacted to these 
egregious violations by subordinating the American military to civilian 
control and limiting the use of the military domestically to 
extraordinary circumstances.85 
The events surrounding the Civil War and the use of federal troops 
during Reconstruction spurred the passage of the PCA in 1877.86 
Federal troops were relied on to execute the laws as southern state 
governments were rebuilt following the Civil War.87 The placement of 
federal troops at polling places during the election of 1876 and the 
subsequent contested results, in particular, led Congress to act.88 The 
text of the PCA reads: 
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly 
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any 
part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise 
to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than two years, or both.89 
The language of the PCA leaves room for exceptions—the PCA 
does not apply “under circumstances expressly authorized by the 
Constitution or Act of Congress.”90 Congress has used this clause to 
 
 83.  David Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History of Military Troops 
in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1, 24 (1971). 
 84.  The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776). 
 85.  E.g., U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the 
actual Service of the United States . . . .”); U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall 
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each 
of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the 
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”) (emphasis added); see also William 
C. Banks, Providing “Supplemental Security”—The Insurrection Act and the Military Role in 
Responding to Domestic Crises, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 39, 39 (2009) (“Because the 
military grew out of our nation’s revolutionary and constitutional heritage, its subordination to 
civilian control has been a central feature of our government since its beginning.”). 
 86.  Scott R. Tkacz, In Katrina’s Wake: Rethinking the Military’s Role in Domestic 
Emergencies, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 301, 307–08 (2006). 
 87.  Id. at 308. 
 88.  CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42659, THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT AND RELATED 
MATTERS: THE USE OF THE MILITARY TO EXECUTE CIVILIAN LAW 21 (2018). 
 89.  18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2018). 
 90.  Id. 
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create many statutory exceptions to the PCA, including the 
Insurrection Act.91 
B. The Insurrection Act 
While the Founding Fathers recognized the perils of an unfettered 
military, the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit the use of federal 
troops to control civilians. Recognizing that the federal army may need 
to defend the fledgling country from domestic rebellion, Congress 
quickly authorized the president to call forth the militia in line with the 
Constitution.92 
The Calling Forth Act of 1792 gave the President the authority to 
“call forth such number of the militia of the state or states most 
convenient to the place of danger or scene of action, as he may judge 
necessary to repel such invasion” in the event the United States “shall 
be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign 
nation or Indian tribe.”93 The Act also authorized the President call 
forth the militia “to cause the laws to be duly executed” in the event 
that ordinary judicial proceedings or the power of the federal marshals 
is not enough to cease the obstruction of laws.94 Under the authority of 
this statute, President Washington quashed the Whiskey Rebellion in 
Pennsylvania two years after enactment, calling forth 13,000 
militiamen from four states.95 
The modern version of the Insurrection Act strongly resembles 
the language of the early Calling Forth Act.96 The Insurrection Act is 
broken into five sections, with sections 251–253 outlining the 
President’s power to call forth the militia to execute the laws. Section 
251 provides that “[w]henever there is an insurrection in any State 
against its government, the President may, upon the request of its 
legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call 
 
 91.  See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 88, at 31–32 n.224 (listing over 20 statutory 
exceptions). 
 92.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (authorizing Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth the 
Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions”). 
 93.  Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795). 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  WILLIAM C. BANKS & STEPHEN DYCUS, SOLDIERS ON THE HOME FRONT 50–51 (2016); 
see also President George Washington, Proclamation of September 15, 1792, Founders Online, 
NATIONAL ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-11-02-0058 (last 
visited Dec. 11, 2018). 
 96.  But see infra part VI for a discussion on the amendment to the Insurrection Act, 10 
U.S.C. §§ 251-255, both passed and repealed in the years after Hurricane Katrina. 
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into Federal service such of the militia of the other States.” 97 Section 
252 may be invoked when “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or 
assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, 
make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any 
State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.”98 In such 
circumstances, the President “may call into Federal service such of the 
militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers 
necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.”99 Section 
253 enables the President to use the militia or the armed forces to 
suppress “any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, 
or conspiracy, if it . . . hinders the execution of the laws of that State” 
and “constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to 
protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection.”100 
It also applies when an insurrection “opposes or obstructs the 
execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of 
justice under those laws.” 101 
Following the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, Congress briefly 
amended Section 253 to clarify the circumstances when the 
Insurrection Act could be invoked.102 The John Warner National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 was largely an 
appropriations bill with one amendment to the Insurrection Act 
“slipped in” that sparked significant outrage from state politicians.103 
The revised version amended the language of the Act and provided 
that the President “may employ the armed forces” to “restore public 
order and enforce the laws . . . when, as a result of a natural disaster, 
epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or 
incident, or other condition in any State or possession of the United 
States, the President determines that domestic violence has 
occurred . . . .”104 The amendment triggered a strong response from 
state governors who decried the amendment as a gross expansion of 
 
 97.  10 U.S.C. § 251 (2018). 
 98.  10 U.S.C. § 252 (2018). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  10 U.S.C. § 253 (2018). 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-
364, § 1076, 120 Stat. 2083, 2404, repealed by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181 § 1068, 122 Stat. 3, 325. See infra Part VI for further discussion of the 
amendment. 
 103.  See 152 Cong. Rec. 21697 (2006) (statement of Senator Leahy) (“The implications of 
changing the act are enormous, but this change was just slipped in the defense bill as a rider with 
little study.”). 
 104. 10 U.S.C § 333 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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federal power into their traditional role as commanders of each of their 
state National Guard.105 The amendment was repealed a year later 
following an outcry from all fifty state governors and members of 
Congress.106 
The Insurrection Act has only been used sporadically by 
Presidents in recent years. Both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy 
invoked the Insurrection Act to send federal troops to aid 
desegregation,107 and President George H.W. Bush invoked the 
Insurrection Act to help restore law and order in the midst of the 
Rodney King riots in 1992.108 Although President George W. Bush 
considered the Insurrection Act following reports of rioting and 
lawlessness in Hurricane Katrina’s wake, federalism issues and public 
opinion may have kept him from invoking the Act.109 
IV. THE MILITARY RESPONSE 
The military actors responding to disaster scenarios can be divided 
into the National Guard, federal military forces, and State Defense 
Forces. The National Guard, usually under the command and control 
of the governor, is the primary military group responsible for disaster 
response and relief. In situations where the local response is 
overwhelmed, federal military forces—active duty Army, Navy, 
Marine, and Air Force servicemen and women—can be called upon for 
additional support. Many states also have state militias that can support 
response activities. 
A. The National Guard 
The National Guard is usually a state’s most important military 
asset in responding to natural disasters and lending military support to 
local authorities. The National Guard is uniquely situated because they 
can serve under a state governor or the President, depending on the 
circumstances. First, in response to natural disasters, man-made 
disasters, and Homeland Security missions, a state governor can 
 
 105.  See Jennifer Steinhauer, Governors Resist Shifting Authority Over Guard, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 15, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/15/us/15governors.html (noting that the 
governors claimed the amendment “would undermine their authority and autonomy”). 
 106.  Id.; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181 § 
1068, 122 Stat. 3, 325. 
 107.  CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 88, at 42. 
 108.  Exec. Order No. 12804, 57 Fed. Reg. 19,361 (May 5, 1992) (providing for the restoration 
of law and order in the city and county of Los Angeles, and other districts of California). 
 109.  See infra Part V for further discussion of this sequence of events. 
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activate the state National Guard to “state active duty” (SAD).110 
Under SAD, the National Guard serves under the command of their 
respective state governor through an adjutant general, receives state 
benefits and payment, and is not subject to the restrictions of the 
PCA.111 
Second, the National Guard can serve under Title 32 status at the 
request of the Governor and approval of the President.112 Under Title 
32, the National Guard remains under the command of the state 
governor and exempt from the PCA while receiving federal pay and 
benefits.113 Title 32 status is particularly useful “for operations 
spanning multiple states, as it eliminates the disparity in state pay rates 
and ensures governors command integrity of the National Guard 
forces.”114 
Third, under Title 10, the President can federalize the National 
Guard by either ordering the National Guard to active duty as reserves 
or by calling the National Guard into Federal service as a militia.115 
When serving under Title 10, “active duty” means full-time duty in the 
active military service of the United States.116 Under Title 10, the 
President serves as the Commander-in-Chief of the “activated” 
National Guard units, and the National Guard troops are subject to the 
restrictions of the PCA.117 Generally, Title 10 status is reserved for 
international deployments.118 
B. Federal Military Forces 
Whereas the National Guard can operate under three different 
duty statuses domestically, federal military forces—active and Reserve 
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps troops—are always under 
the command and control of the President under Title 10.119 As such, 
 
 110.  E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 44-75.1(4) (West 2018). See also STEVE BOWMAN ET AL., CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL33095, HURRICANE KATRINA: DOD DISASTER RESPONSE 7 (2005), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33095.pdf. 
 111.  BOWMAN, supra note 110. 
 112.  32 U.S.C. § 502(f) (2018). 
 113.  Id.; BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 110, at 8. 
 114.  Ryan Burke, Lessons from Katrina: Commanding the Military During Disaster 
Response—Then and Now, 12 INT. J. EMERGENCY. MGMT. 221, 223 (2016). 
 115.  10 U.S.C. § 12304 (2018). 
 116.  10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(1) (2018). 
 117.  BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 110, at 9. 
 118.  Burke, supra note 114 at 223. 
 119.  Id.; see e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 3011 (2018) (“The Department of the Army is separately 
organized under the Secretary of the Army. It operates under the authority, direction, and control 
of the Secretary of Defense.”). 
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federal military forces are subject to the restrictions of the PCA.120 
Even with these restrictions, federal military forces play a role in 
domestic disaster response, such as “[i]nfrastructure protection and 
emergency repair” and “[e]mergency contracting support for lifesaving 
and life-sustaining services.”121 
Although the Coast Guard is part of the “armed forces” as defined 
in 10 U.S.C.   § 101(a)(4), the Coast Guard operates under the 
Department of Homeland Security during peacetime.122 The President 
or Congress can transfer the Coast Guard to the Department of the 
Navy in times of war.123 Unlike other armed forces, Congress delegated 
explicit law enforcement authority to the Coast Guard, thus exempting 
it from the PCA.124 
C. State Defense Forces 
State Defense Forces (SDFs) are local military forces that operate 
solely under the authority of state governments. SDFs were born out 
of America’s longstanding militia tradition and the Second 
Amendment.125 The Militia Act of 1903 brought all state militia forces 
under the umbrella of the National Guard.126 However, when nearly all 
National Guard troops mobilized in World War I, state governors 
called for organized state militias.127 The Home Defense Act of 1917 
permitted the states to organize state defense forces when the National 
Guard was federalized.128 Congress officially recognized SDFs in 1956, 
under Title 32 of the U.S. Code: 
In addition to its National Guard, if any, a State, the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, or the Virgin 
 
 120.  18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2018). 
 121.  NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, supra note 65, at 34. 
 122.  14 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2018). 
 123.  14 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2018). 
 124.  See 14 U.S.C. § 522 (2018) (“The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, 
inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United 
States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the 
United States.”); 14 U.S.C. § 703 (2018) (empowering “[c]ommissioned, warrant, and petty 
officers of the Coast Guard” as customs officers”). 
 125.  See U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of 
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). 
 126.  Militia Act of 1903, 32 Stat. 775 (1903). 
 127.  See Eric Durr, New York Guard was Born in World War I as the National Guard Went 
to War, U.S. ARMY (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.army.mil/article/186638/new_york_guard_was_ 
born_in_ world_war_i_as_the_national_guard_went_to_war (“That need to replace National 
Guard Soldiers who had been protecting railroad bridges, water lines and canals resulted in the 
creation of the New York Guard, the state’s volunteer self-defense force, on Aug. 3, 1917.”). 
 128.  National Defense Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64–85, 39 Stat. 166. 
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Islands may, as provided by its laws, organize and maintain defense 
forces. A defense force established under this section may be used 
within the jurisdiction concerned, as its chief executive (or 
commanding general in the case of the District of Columbia) 
considers necessary, but it may not be called, ordered, or drafted into 
the armed forces.129 
State defense forces are organized and authorized under state law, 
in compliance with 32 U.S.C. § 109(c).130 As of 2012, more than 20 states 
and Puerto Rico had established state guards, with total membership 
over 14,000.131 Texas, Virginia, and Georgia, in particular, have robust 
SDFs and even have SDF navies.132 Unlike the National Guard and 
federal military forces, SDFs generally cannot be federalized and are 
always under the command of their respective governors through an 
adjutant general.133 However, like the National Guard, SDFs can 
deploy to other states at the request of the governor.134 They are 
generally used when the National Guard is “either undermanned, 
federalized by the [P]resident under the Stafford Act, deployed in 
support of federal forces, or eliminated by a foreign enemy.”135 
Although SDFs and the National Guard work together under the 
 
 129.  32 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2018); see also 32 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1956). 
 130.  For example, the Texas State Guard is defined as the “volunteer military forces that 
provide community service and emergency response activities for this state, as organized under 
the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, and operating as a defense force 
authorized under 32 U.S.C. Section 109.” TEX. GOV’T CODE. ANN. § 437.001(16) (West 2018). 
 131.  James Carafano et al., Why More States Should Establish State Defense Forces, 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER 2 (Feb. 28, 2012), https://www.heritage.org/defense/ 
report/why-more-states-should-establish-state-defense-forces. 
 132.  See id. 
 133.  Id. at 3; but see infra Part VI for a brief discussion of the uncertainties regarding the 
President’s ability to call forth SDFs. 
 134.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-91 (West 2018), which provides that: 
(a) Upon the request of the governor of another state, the Governor in his discretion 
may order all or any portion of the organized militia to assist the military or police forces 
of the other state who are actually engaged in defending the other state. Such forces may 
be recalled by the Governor at his discretion. 
(b) The Governor in his discretion may request the governor of another state to order 
all or any portion of the organized militia of the other state to assist the military or police 
forces of this state who are actually engaged in defending this state. 
 135.  Jonathon R. Pohnel, State Defense Forces and Their Role in American Homeland 
Security (Mar. 2015) (unpublished master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School) (on file with the 
Dudley Knox Library, Naval Postgraduate School), https://sgaus.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/10/15Mar_Pohnel_ Jonathan.pdf; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 44-54.4 (West 2018) (stating 
that Virginia Defense Force shall “provide for an adequately trained organized reserve militia to 
assume control . . . in the event of the mobilization of the Virginia National Guard” and “provide 
a military force to respond to the call of the Governor in those circumstances described in § 44-
75.1.”). Circumstances included under VA. CODE ANN. § 44-75.1 (West 2018) include insurrection, 
obstructing the execution of laws, natural or man-made disasters. 
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adjutant general, members are prohibited from serving in the SDF and 
the National Guard simultaneously.136 
V. HURRICANES KATRINA AND CORA: HIGHLIGHTING THE NEED 
FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION 
Hurricane Katrina and “Hurricane Cora” serve as examples for 
the military response to natural disasters. Hurricane Katrina provides 
a real-life example of a catastrophic natural disaster that required a 
massive mobilization of military forces to assist with relief. While 
devastating, it serves as a case study for disaster management and 
spurred an outpouring of academic literature on disaster response, 
including in-depth critiques of the military’s role and the federalism 
issues that may have hampered the military’s response time.137 
Hurricane Cora, on the other hand, was a simulated hurricane used by 
FEMA as part of its National Level Exercise 2018 to test emergency 
response.138 This simulated hurricane hugged the East Coast of the 
United States as a Category 4 hurricane from Florida until it made 
landfall near Washington, D.C.139 This simulation is a useful example 
for future disaster management because hurricanes may move further 
north as a result of climate change, putting major cities like 
Washington, D.C. and New York City at risk. It also provides a 
scenario where five or more states could all be significantly impacted 
from the same storm, highlighting the need for an integrated, 
communicative, and centralized response network. 
The federal military response to Hurricane Katrina highlights 
many of the issues that could still affect the military response to natural 
disasters today and serves as a reminder to prepare for worst-case 
disaster scenarios. With a more flexible Insurrection Act and clearer 
communication, President Bush’s response to Hurricane Katrina likely 
would have occurred quicker and reduced some of the chaos 
experienced in the first days following landfall. Hurricane Katrina 
 
 136.  See 32 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2018) (“A person may not become a member of a defense force 
established under subsection (c) if he is a member of a reserve component of the armed forces.”). 
 137.  E.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-643, HURRICANE KATRINA: 
BETTER PLANS AND EXERCISES NEEDED TO GUIDE THE MILITARY’S RESPONSE TO 
CATASTROPHIC NATURAL DISASTERS 21 (2006) [hereinafter GAO HURRICANE KATRINA]; 
Christina E. Wells, Katrina and the Rhetoric of Federalism, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 127 (2007) 
(discussing coordination and preparation failures during Hurricane Katrina). 
 138.  FEMA, NATIONAL LEVEL EXERCISE 2018: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2018), 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1531489062928c7d82e3b92be153719688d9c6d71e1fb/
NLE_EXEC_SUMM2018_20180620_508PASS.PDF. 
 139.  Id. 
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presented a “perfect storm” of problems. First, the population of New 
Orleans was highly vulnerable—large portions of the city fell below the 
poverty line, lacked access to transportation, and lived in portions of 
the city subject to flooding.140 Second, the state and local governments 
inadequately responded to the oncoming hurricane.141 Third, a 
significant portion of Louisiana’s National Guard troops were 
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.142 Lastly, after landfall, many local 
law enforcement officials abandoned their posts.143 
With vast swaths of the city underwater and a dearth of law 
enforcement officials to both maintain order and rescue stranded 
citizens, Louisiana’s Governor Kathleen Blanco refused President 
Bush’s request to federalize the National Guard under the Insurrection 
Act and bring in federal troops.144 According to a Senate Special 
Report issued in 2006, the reasons behind the delayed response remain 
opaque.145 However, the Special Report notes that Governor Blanco 
may have resisted attempts to federalize National Guard troops 
because keeping the National Guard under state control would allow 
them to serve as law enforcement, unfettered by the PCA.146 
President Bush was faced with a dilemma: override Governor 
Blanco and unilaterally deploy federal troops to Louisiana, or obey her 
 
 140.  See generally Shirley B. Laska & Betty Hearn Morrow, Social Vulnerabilities and 
Hurricane Katrina: An Unnatural Disaster in New Orleans, 40 MARINE TECH. SOC’Y J. 16 (2006). 
 141.  See How New Orleans’ Evacuation Plan Fell Apart, NPR (Sept. 23, 2005), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4860776 (discussing how buses were 
diverted to the Superdome—a shelter of last resort—during the evacuation because of traffic, 
nursing homes failed to evacuate, and buses failed to return to the Superdome out of security 
concerns); see also Wells, supra note 137, 137–40. 
 142.  Brock N. Meeks, Guardsmen on a Rescue and Relief Mission, MSNBC (Aug. 30, 2005, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9117367/ns/us_news-katrina_the_long_road_back/t/guardsmen-
rescue-relief-mission/#.XBKis2hKjnE (“About 35 percent, or 3,000 Louisiana National Guard 
troops, ‘[were] supporting deployed operations’ . . . .”); see HURRICANE KATRINA: DOD 
DISASTER RESPONSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33095, 13–14 (2006) (finding that while DoD 
officials denied any negative impact on disaster relief from overseas deployments, anecdotal 
evidence suggests otherwise); BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 95, at 107 (“To complicate matters 
further, much of the Louisiana guard’s critically needed equipment, including radios and 
bulldozers, had been shipped to Iraq to support the ongoing war there.”). 
 143.  Dan Barry & Jere Longman, A Police Department Racked by Doubt and Accusations, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/30/us/nationalspecial/a-police-
department-racked-by-doubt-and-accusations.html. 
 144.  Sean McGrane, Note, Katrina, Federalism, and Military Law Enforcement: A New 
Exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1327 (2010). 
 145.  S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, HURRICANE 
KATRINA: A NATION STILL UNPREPARED 505 (2006), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ 
CRPT-109srpt322/pdf/ CRPT-109srpt322.pdf. 
 146.  Id. at 506. 
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request for local control over the response.147 Hanging in the balance 
was a city in desperate need of assistance. President Bush deferred to 
Governor Blanco and the “federal military response arrived late and 
remained independent of state forces.”148 When federal troops did 
arrive, they were widely viewed as the heroes of Hurricane Katrina, 
and the military response peaked at more than 70,000 troops.149 
Although troops played a critical role in the aftermath of Katrina, 
a Government Accountability Office report found several areas of the 
military’s response in need of improvement, including communication 
and integration of military units.150 Hurricane Katrina “destroyed or 
severely degraded many commercial landline and cellular telephone 
systems, and emergency radio systems were oversubscribed making it 
difficult to establish necessary connections between officials and 
responders at the local, state, and federal levels.”151 Some National 
Guard assets were sent with restrictions on their use, leaving some 
areas with excess communication capabilities while others had none.152 
Furthermore, the federal military forces were under the command and 
control of Northern Command’s Joint Task Force Katrina, while the 
National Guard forces were under command and control of the 
Governors of Mississippi and Louisiana.153 Although response 
operations were coordinated across the groups, they were not 
integrated, which led to inefficiencies and duplication of effort.154 
Now, ten years later, such inefficiencies could still threaten 
disaster response. In 2018, following an “unprecedented” 2017 
hurricane season, FEMA brought together governments, private 
industry, and NGOs for a National Level Exercise to test their ability 
 
 147.  Id. at 1318. One anonymous official stated that Bush’s failure to federalize the Louisiana 
National Guard came down to a question of politics and bad optics: 
“Can you imagine how it would have been perceived if a president of the United States of 
one party had pre-emptively taken from the female governor of another party the 
command and control of her forces, unless the security situation made it completely clear 
that she was unable to effectively execute her command authority and that lawlessness was 
the inevitable result?” 
Eric Lipton et al., Political Issues Snarled Plans for Troop Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2005), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/09/us/nationalspecial/political-issues-snarled-plans-for-troop-
aid .html. 
 148.  BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 95, at 106. 
 149.  GAO HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 137, at 21. 
 150.  See generally id. 
 151.  Id. at 25. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  See generally id. 
 154.  Id. at 26. 
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to respond to a hurricane striking the Mid-Atlantic, a threat 
comparable to Katrina.155 National Level Exercises are congressionally 
mandated, biannual simulations to “test and evaluate the readiness of 
Federal, State, local, and tribal governments to respond and recover in 
a coordinated and unified manner to catastrophic incidents.”156 The 
most recent National Level Exercise was a simulated Category 4 
hurricane. In the model, Hurricane Cora made landfall near Hampton 
Roads, Virginia “bringing a 15-foot (0.3 meter) storm surge and up to 
9 inches (23 centimeters) of rain to some areas within the first six 
hours.”157 Such a hurricane would directly impact Washington, D.C., 
Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Delaware with 
indirect impacts likely felt throughout the Eastern seaboard. 
The simulated results were certainly catastrophic. An Associated 
Press article described the destruction: 
In the scenario, Cora also slammed hurricane-force winds into three 
nuclear power stations. One was damaged. Thirty-three major power 
substations were at risk from storm surge and major flooding. Key 
roads and bridges were also damaged, and debris blocked the 
Newport News Channel and other waterways. Coast Guard Station 
Cape Charles lost power, and Coast Guard Station Chincoteague 
was severely damaged by high winds. The ferocious fictional storm 
also damaged and closed Reagan National Airport in Washington. 
The make-believe hurricane threatened hundreds of cell towers, and 
the area where power was knocked out included 135 data centers in 
Virginia and another 60 in Maryland.158 
Unlike many of the recent hurricanes that have effects limited to 
one or two states, a mid-Atlantic or northeastern landfall would 
require a coordinated response effort across several states. In these 
scenarios, natural disasters lose their localized character. In the same 
way that Hurricane Katrina had far-reaching ramifications on oil 
prices, a direct hurricane impact on Washington, D.C. or New York 
City could have economic and political ramifications across the 
country.159 Such a hurricane would disrupt both air and sea traffic, 
 
 155.  FEMA to Conduct National Level Exercise, FEMA (May 2, 2018), https://www.fema. 
gov/news-release/2018/05/02/fema-conduct-national-level-exercise; FEMA, supra note 138, at 1. 
 156.  6 U.S.C. § 748(b)(3)(A) (2018); National Level Exercise 2018, FEMA, https://www.fema. 
gov/nle (last visited Dec. 12, 2018). 
 157.  Jeff Martin, Category 4 Hurricane Devastates East Coast in FEMA Simulation, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 11, 2018), https://apnews.com/2a3ea3cb7cd949939120121d88de94bc. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  E.g. Katrina and Oil Prices, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 7, 2015), 
https://www.cfr.org/interview/katrina-and-oil-prices. 
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leading to disruptions to some of the busiest airports and seaports in 
the United States. 
Both of these hurricane scenarios provide insight into disaster 
preparation and response. The tragedy of Hurricane Katrina exposed 
gaps in disaster preparation and provides positive proof of the need to 
improve emergency response systems across all levels of government. 
The possibility of an actual event like the Hurricane Cora exercise 
raises similar questions about response issues that need to be addressed 
promptly in the face of potential increases in hurricane frequency and 
intensity. 
VI. EXPANDING THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN A WARMING 
WORLD 
The local, state, and federal government should prepare for worst-
case natural disaster scenarios, akin to Hurricanes Katrina and Cora. 
Congress should clarify the powers of the President to call forth the 
militia and provide a more flexible framework for federalization in 
catastrophic disaster scenarios. Congress should also attempt to 
remove the inefficiencies that led to the conflict between Governor 
Blanco and President Bush in the days following Hurricane Katrina’s 
landfall in Louisiana. Although it is possible that the President may 
need to federalize the National Guard against a governor’s wishes, the 
likelihood of that situation remains small. The President can still 
provide military support and assistance without coming into conflict 
with the PCA. 
Furthermore, many natural disaster responses can be handled at 
the local and state levels. However, with the threat of climate change 
and ever-increasing natural disasters, states should invest in State 
Defense Forces to better respond to natural disasters and reduce the 
need for federal assistance. State defense forces can be a cost-effective, 
local solution to a growing need for emergency responders. 
A. The Tools for Effective Disaster Response 
Congress should give the U.S. military the tools to effectively and 
efficiently respond to catastrophic natural disasters, while specifying 
the situations in which such tools can be used. To reduce any risk of 
delaying disaster response in the future, the Federal and state 
governments should address any potential federalism issues early, via 
legislation or agency procedures. 
Hurricane Cora highlighted some of the unusual problems 
associated with a mid-Atlantic hurricane, including the interesting 
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logistical scenario of having the President act as the Commander-in-
Chief of the District of Columbia National Guard while state governors 
would, at least initially, control their respective National Guards.160 It 
would be possible for the President, through the Secretary of Defense, 
to have to coordinate with state governors to have non-District of 
Columbia National Guard units operating in Washington, D.C. These 
National Guard units would probably not be considered “federalized” 
but would still effectively be operating under the command of the 
President. In this scenario, it is unclear whether they would fall under 
Title 32 or Title 10 status. The distinction may not have a functional 
impact but could slow the response time by creating confusion over the 
scope of their abilities and their command structure in the same way 
that federalism questions stalled the Katrina response. 
One proposed solution—the use of a dual commander for multi-
state disaster response—was codified in the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.161 A dual-status commander 
(DSC) acts either under state status or under Title 10 as a Federal 
officer but may receive orders from either chain of command.162  The 
new provision states that: 
When the Armed Forces and the National Guard are employed 
simultaneously in support of civil authorities in the United States, 
appointment of a commissioned officer as a dual-status 
commander . . . should be the usual and customary command and 
control arrangement, including for missions involving a major 
disaster or emergency as those terms are defined in section 102 of 
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act (42 U.S.C. § 5122).163 
 
 160.  D.C. CODE ANN. § 49-409 (2019) (“The President of the United States shall be the 
Commander-in-Chief of the militia of the District of Columbia.”). While the President is the 
Commander-in-Chief, Executive Order 11,485 “authorized and directed [the Secretary of 
Defense] to supervise, administer and control the Army National Guard and the Air National 
Guard of the District of Columbia . . . while in militia status.” Executive Order 11,485 also states 
that the Secretary of Defense “may order out the National Guard under title 39 of the District of 
Columbia Code to aid the civil authorities of the District of Columbia” but that such orders are 
“subject to the direction of the President as Commander-in-Chief.” Exec. Order No. 11,485, 34 
Fed. Reg. 15439, 15443 (Oct. 4, 1969). 
 161.  See generally National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
81, § 515, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/1540/text. 
 162.  CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS (CLAMO), DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL 
LAW 2018 HANDBOOK FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 68 (2018), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_ 
Law/pdf/ domestic-law-handbook-2018.pdf. 
 163.  10 U.S.C. § 12304a(c)(1) (2018). 
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Although the use of a DSC has been generally successful,164 it is 
reasonable to prepare for a Katrina-like scenario where a governor 
refuses to assent to a DSC.165 Because both the state and the President 
have to agree to install a DSC,166 it may be beneficial to create a 
procedure that can be used in lieu of mutual agreement or to trump 
mutual agreement. For example, additional language could make the 
dual-status command the only command structure, other than 
Presidential control, in “major disasters” or “emergencies” that 
involve more than one state. Similarly, a procedure should be 
established for conflicting orders from both chains of command. While 
DoD directives currently advise the DSC to seek counsel from a Judge 
Advocate from each chain of command, it does not provide instruction 
if both sides refuse to agree.167 While one possible solution is to dissolve 
the dual-status commander role, DoD should further clarify this to 
prevent delays if the situation arose in the future. Except in this unique 
circumstance, the use of a DSC should be a far less contentious 
alternative to the invocation of the Insurrection Act because it 
addresses federalism concerns by keeping some state control over the 
National Guard. 
Another proposed solution would be to re-adopt the 2007 
amendment to the Insurrection Act to clarify when the President may 
invoke the act following a natural disaster. The Insurrection Act is only 
invoked in extraordinary situations. Most natural disasters are 
relatively local and will not require large-scale federal intervention; 
however, Congress should plan for a worst-case scenario and ensure 
that the President is not hindered by federalism questions. Although 
there is a long American tradition of separating the U.S. military from 
domestic policing, the exceptions to the PCA undermine this 
distinction. While the National Guard under the command and control 
of a governor can enforce laws, the same National Guard loses that 
power when under the command and control of the President.168 If one 
of the concerns related to the military enforcing laws is a lack of 
 
 164.  RYAN BURKE & SUE MCNEIL, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, TOWARD A UNIFIED 
MILITARY RESPONSE: HURRICANE SANDY AND THE DUAL STATUS COMMANDER 54–61 (2015). 
 165.  Notably, President Bush and Governor Blanco discussed the prospect of using a dual-
status commander following the landfall of Hurricane Katrina. Governor Blanco refused. S. 
COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, supra note 145, at 70. 
 166.  Dual Status Commander (DSC), NAT’L GUARD (Dec. 2017), https://www.nationalguard 
.mil/Portals/31/Resources/Fact%20Sheets/Dual%20Status%20Commander%20Fact%20Sheet
%20(Dec.%202017).pdf  
 167.  JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 78, at D-2–D-3. 
 168.  NAT’L GUARD, supra note 166. 
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training or familiarity with domestic law, then this distinction between 
the federalized National Guard and state-controlled National Guard 
appears arbitrary. The same National Guard troops that could enforce 
laws under state control could not do so under federal control. The 
2007 amendment to the Insurrection Act would have allowed the 
President to invoke the Act in response to a natural disaster and utilize 
the armed forces and the National Guard to enforce laws and “restore 
public order.”169 Thus, the National Guard would be able to act as law 
enforcement even under federal control in instances specifically listed 
in the statute.170 Congress should reconsider the 2007 amendment to 
the Insurrection Act or consider alternative exceptions to the PCA that 
would only activate in response to a major natural disaster. 
The Senate Armed Service Committee characterized the 2007 
amendment to the PCA as: 
[A] provision that would update the Insurrection Act to clarify the 
President’s authority to use the armed forces, including the National 
Guard in federal service, to restore order and enforce federal laws in 
cases where, as a result of a terrorist attack, epidemic, or natural 
disaster, public order has broken down.171 
The Senate Committee Report on the amendment further stated that 
the pre-amendment Insurrection Act “grant[ed] the President broad 
powers to use the armed forces in situations of public disorder . . . .”172 
However, “the antique terminology and the lack of explicit reference 
to such situations as natural disasters or terrorist attacks may have 
contributed to a reluctance to use the armed forces in situations such 
as Hurricane Katrina.”173 The report also noted that the President’s 
authority is temporary and subject to notification requirements to 
Congress.174 
The most notable change to the Insurrection Act from the 
amendment came in the form of enumerated instances—”natural 
disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist 
attack or incident”—that could cause “domestic violence” to such an 
 
 169.  John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-
364, § 1076, 120 Stat. 2083, 2404, repealed by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181 § 1068, 122 Stat. 3, 325. For an in-depth discussion of the changes to the 
Insurrection Act resulting from the 2007 amendment, see Thaddeus A. Hoffmeister, An 
Insurrection Act for the 21st Century, 39 STETSON L. REV. 861 (2010). 
 170.  See id. 
 171.  S. Rep. No. 109-254, at 5 (2006). 
 172.  Id. at 384. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
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extent that the state is unable to maintain public order.175 In these 
instances, the President “may employ the armed forces, including the 
National Guard in Federal service, to restore public order and enforce 
the laws of the United States . . . .”176 
While Senator Leahy and all fifty governors railed against the 
amendment as a gross expansion of presidential power and an 
infringement on states’ rights,177 at least one commentator believes that 
the amendment did nothing to change the President’s substantive 
powers but rather clarified when the Insurrection Act could be used.178 
Congress should reconsider this amendment and allow for a robust 
debate, rather than hiding the amendment in an appropriations bill. 
Many of the changes to the Insurrection Act are likely less offensive 
than the state governors feared.179 
If Congress keeps the unamended Insurrection Act, Congress 
should consider providing statutory definitions to some of the terms in 
the Act to clarify the circumstances in which the Act can be invoked. 
The Insurrection Act is riddled with undefined words and phrases that 
hinder its effective use. While courts have generally interpreted 
“insurrection” to mean an armed uprising against the government, 
Presidents have interpreted it to mean anything from a riot to an 
uprising.180 Congress could provide definitions for some of the terms, 
like “insurrection” and “domestic violence,” that would specifically 
address events following catastrophic natural disasters. This would 
achieve effectively the same result as amending the Insurrection Act 
directly without altering the original terminology. 
 
 175.  John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, supra note 102. 
 176.  Id. Compare this with the current Insurrection Act that states: “The President, by using 
the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he 
considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful 
combination, or conspiracy” that hinders or obstructs the execution of the laws. 10 U.S.C. § 253. 
 177.  See 152 Cong. Rec. 21696 (2006) (remarks by Senator Leahy) (stating that the 
amendment “subvert[s] solid, longstanding posse comitatus statutes that limit the military’s 
involvement in law enforcement, thereby making it easier for the President to declare martial 
law”); David S. Broder, Governors Wary of Change on Troops, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2006) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/08/05/AR2006080500732.html, 
(“Iowa Gov. Tom Vilsack, the senior Democrat, called the proposal ‘one step away from a 
complete takeover of the National Guard, the end of the Guard as a dual-function force that can 
respond  to both state  and national needs.’”). 
 178.  Danielle Crockett, The Insurrection Act and Executive Power to Respond with Force 
to Natural Disasters 3–4 (unpublished research paper, available online with Berkeley Law library 
at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/resources/disasters/Crockett.pdf). 
 179.  Hoffmeister, supra note 169 at 901–03. 
 180.  Id. at 901 n.248. 
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The 2007 amendment also altered what military forces the 
President can call forth by changing the word “militia” to “National 
Guard.”181 While this may seem like a minor change, it could actually 
limit the military forces that the President can call forth by prohibiting 
the federalization of state militias, or SDFs.182 Under the current 
Insurrection Act, the President can rely on the “militia or the armed 
forces” to enforce laws.183 While 32 U.S.C. § 109(c) states that SDFs 
“may not be called, ordered, or drafted into the armed forces,” it is 
currently unclear whether or not this exempts SDFs from ever being 
federalized. In Perpich v. Department of Defense, the Supreme Court 
refused to decide the issue but stated that “[i]t is nonetheless possible 
that [SDFs] are subject to call under [the Insurrection Act] which 
distinguish the ‘militia’ from the ‘armed forces,’ and which appear to 
subject all portions of the ‘militia’—organized or not—to call if needed 
for the purposes specified in the Militia Clauses.”184 In short, the 
amendment provided a stronger guarantee that SDFs would remain 
under state-control if the Insurrection Act were invoked than the 
current version of the Act. This, combined with more robust SDFs, 
could address some of the governors’ concerns about federal 
usurpation of their control over state military forces.  
In addition to the original changes made in the 2007 amendment— 
namely specifying causes of domestic violence, changing the term 
“militia” to “National Guard,” and making the President’s decision to 
employ the armed forces to restore order discretionary185—Congress 
could institute more checks on the President’s power. Congress might 
insert a ten-day time limit to § 233, like the Stafford Act’s emergency 
powers provision, that can be extended with a request from the 
 
 181.  Compare 10 U.S.C. § 253 (“The President, by using the militia or the armed forces . . . 
.”), with John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, supra note 102 
(“The President may employ the armed forces, including the National Guard in Federal 
service . . . .”). 
 182.  See Hoffmeister, supra note 169 at 902–03 (noting that the 2007 amendment would have 
limited the President to calling forth federal armed forces and the National Guard, not SDFs). 
 183.  10 U.S.C. § 253. 
 184.  496 U.S. 334, 352 n.25 (1990). Note that at the time of this decision, the Insurrection Act 
was codified at § 333. 
 185.  See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, supra note 
102 (changing 10 U.S.C. § 333, now 10 U.S.C. § 253, from the President “shall take such measures 
as he considers necessary” to “[t]he President may employ the armed forces”) (emphasis added); 
see also Hoffmeister, supra note 169 at 903 (noting that the amendment made Presidential action 
optional). 
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governor or through congressional approval.186 But, by only adding a 
ten-day limit to § 233 which specifically addresses natural disasters, the 
President would still have the ability to invoke § 231 or § 232 should 
the situation call for it. 
Several commentators have proposed federalism checks to the 
Insurrection Act, such as requiring judicial approval to federalize the 
militia.187 Perhaps a more effective federalism check is already codified 
in § 231. Section 231 provides that in the event of insurrection, “the 
President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if 
the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service . . . the 
militia.”188 Prior to landfall, in the case of hurricanes, the state 
legislature can plan to call a special session to take place a few days 
later.189 This would allow the state legislature, without the input of the 
governor, to meet and request Federal intervention via the 
Insurrection Act.  
A potentially controversial but effective method could be 
extending the request power to the local governments of large 
metropolitan areas. Mayors or city councils would be more intimately 
aware of the conditions in their area and could provide a better picture 
of “domestic violence” in their communities.190 Formal requests from 
local governments could also provide political cover and support for 
the President’s decision to federalize troops. While the President will 
 
 186.  See 42 U.S.C. § 5170b (“Such emergency work may only be carried out for a period not 
to exceed 10 days.”). Note that Congress has recognized the broad powers conferred to the 
Department of Defense under the Stafford Act. Title 6 of the U.S. Code states: 
[T]he Posse Comitatus Act is not a complete barrier to the use of the Armed Forces for 
a range of domestic purposes, including law enforcement functions, when the use of the 
Armed Forces is authorized by Act of Congress or the President determines that the use 
of the Armed Forces is required to fulfill the President’s obligations under the 
Constitution to respond promptly in time of war, insurrection, or other serious 
emergency. 
6 U.S.C. § 466 (2018) (emphasis added). Existing laws, including chapter 15 of title 10 (commonly 
known as the “Insurrection Act”), and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.), grant the President broad powers that may be invoked in 
the event of domestic emergencies, including an attack against the Nation using weapons of mass 
destruction, and these laws specifically authorize the President to use the Armed Forces to help 
restore public order. 
 187.  McGrane, supra note 144, at 1333; Hoffmeister, supra note 169 at 914. 
 188.  10 U.S.C. § 251 (emphasis added). 
 189.  N.C. Legislature to Convene October 2nd for Hurricane Florence Relief Session, 
ABERDEEN TIMES (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.aberdeentimes.com/goverment/local-
government-news/9272-n-c-legislature-to-convene-october-2-for-hurricane-florence-relief-
session. 
 190.  See 10 U.S.C. § 253 (“The President . . .shall take such measures as he considers 
necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or 
conspiracy”) (emphasis added). 
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only rarely need to invoke the Insurrection Act in the wake of a natural 
disaster, Congress should streamline the process and account for 
federalism concerns now before such a disaster arises. 
B. When in Doubt, Organize a Militia: SDFs as a Response to 
Federalism Concerns 
The Insurrection and the Stafford Acts are invoked only when 
local and state resources are overwhelmed. States that feel threatened 
by changes to the Insurrection Act could do more to ensure that their 
local resources will not be overwhelmed, such as creating a robust State 
Defense Force (SDF). SDFs are trained, local, and organized militias 
that can augment state resources as emergency responders, law 
enforcement, or support to the National Guard. When federal aid can 
take days to arrive, access to a reliable, local source is essential in a 
disaster scenario. Regardless of changes to the Insurrection Act, states 
should strongly consider forming SDFs in light of changes in climate 
and the resulting disaster scenarios. In particular, the three states 
susceptible to hurricanes that do not currently have a SDF—Florida, 
North Carolina, and Alabama—should strongly consider creating one. 
To both avoid federalism concerns and quickly respond to disasters, 
states should strive to be as minimally dependent on the federal 
government for disaster response as possible. 
There are many advantages to SDFs over federal military forces 
and out-of-state National Guard units. First, they reside in their 
respective states and can therefore respond quickly. Second, unlike 
their National Guard counterparts, they cannot be deployed or 
federalized.191 Third, SDFs can be specially trained for particular types 
of disasters or emergencies, and each state can determine what training 
their SDFs receive.192 Because SDFs are flexible, they can be utilized 
for a variety of functions. Rather than only supplementing National 
Guard units, SDFs can serve as emergency responders and be stationed 
 
 191.  Although many commentators have maintained this, in extraordinary instances it may 
be possible for the President to call forth state defense forces. See Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 
U.S. 334, 352 n.25 (1990) (“It is nonetheless possible that [SDFs] are subject to call under 10 
U.S.C. §§ 331–333, which distinguish the ‘militia’ from the ‘armed forces,’ and which appear to 
subject all portions of the ‘militia’—organized or not—to call if needed for the purposes specified 
in the Militia Clauses.”). 
 192.  See Kent G. Sieg, America’s State Defense Forces: An Historical Component of National 
Defense, 1 STATE DEF. FORCE J. 1, 7 (2005), http://www.sdfpubcntr.net/introduction.htm 
(“Individual members of these guards can be trained to provide for physical security, crowd 
control, and medical and logistical support to reserve and regular forces as well as to local and 
state authorities.”). 
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in communities across the state to quickly respond to local needs.193 
Some states, like Texas and Maryland, even utilize SDFs to provide 
medical care and support in emergency situations.194 
Although they have certain drawbacks, including inconsistent use, 
lack of training, and a history of scandals,195 SDFs provide a relatively 
inexpensive and local supplement to emergency responders and 
National Guard units. Representative Joe Wilson of South Carolina 
attempted to address some of these issues with the State Defense 
Improvement Act in 2009. The proposed bill aimed “to improve the 
readiness of State defense forces and to increase military coordination 
for homeland security between the States and the Department of 
Defense.”196 It also intended to address gaps in current legislation 
pertaining to SDFs. The bill called for the Secretary of Homeland 
Security and the Secretary of Defense to coordinate homeland security 
efforts with SDFs and clarified DoD and Homeland Security’s ability 
to provide training to SDFs.197 The bill also allowed for the Secretary 
of Defense to transfer excess DoD property to SDFs.198 
While the bill never made it out of committee, it does provide a 
roadmap of improvements that can be made to the current SDF 
framework; states should address coordination, training, public 
perception, recruitment, and funding issues related to SDFs. First, 
there should be increased collaboration and integration amongst 
National Guard and SDF forces. Notably, the National Guard may 
train with SDFs but cannot use federal funds to do so.199 While states 
 
 193.  See Pohnel, supra note 135 (proposing that “SDF members could be arranged like local 
volunteer firemen”). 
 194.  Ralph Jay Johnson, Paramilitary Provision of Adequate Disaster Response and 
Advancement of Public Health: The Case of the Texas State Guard and Operation Lone Star, 11 
DISASTER MED. PUB. HEALTH PREP. 412 (2017); 
Charles E. Wiles & H. Wayne Nelson, “The National Guard for the National Guard” State Defense 
Force Medical Support for the National Guard, 174 MILITARY MED. xii, xii (2009). 
 195.  Eric Kelderman, State Defense Forces Grow, Project New Image, STATELINE (Dec. 31, 
2003), https://web.archive.org/web/20120712202018/http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/ 
headlines/state-defense-forces-grow-project-new-image-85899393830 (noting that the Virginia 
General Assembly investigated its state defense force in 1990 on reports that “a brigade was 
saving money to buy a tank and other units were practicing ad hoc drug raids,” and that Utah 
disbanded its state guard in 1987 “amid media reports that convicted felons and members of the 
white supremacist Aryan Nations had infiltrated the organization”). 
 196.  State Defense Force Improvement Act, H.R. 206, 11th Cong. (2009). 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  NAT’L GUARD BUREAU, CNGBI 5500.01, NATIONAL GUARD INTERACTION WITH 
STATE DEFENSE FORCES, para. 4 (June 15, 2017) (“It is NG policy that the NG may interact with 
SDFs to train and conduct exercises and maneuvers in support of domestic or civil support 
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are responsible for funding their SDFs, it may be beneficial to 
introduce Federal legislation that would allow limited federal funding 
to be used for training purposes. In a real-life disaster scenario, SDFs 
will work alongside the National Guard and active troops, if necessary. 
SDFs will also work with various other state and federal agencies, 
including FEMA. It is in their interests to make sure SDFs are trained 
and have sufficient resources. Federal and state governments should 
ensure that the role of SDFs are sufficiently addressed in emergency 
planning. Because SDFs operate under state command, officials should 
ensure that protocols addressing the proper lines of communication 
and command are in place if the President places the National Guard 
under Title 10 control.200 
Second, SDF forces should be held to a similar standard as the 
National Guard, including commitment to training. A 2014 report by 
the Inspector General of the DoD found that U.S. Northern Command 
staff believed SDFs “lacked national military standards, qualifications, 
Federal background checks, and the means to verify readiness.” As 
such, the Inspector General’s office did not consider or include SDFs 
for military planning.201 To address these concerns, states should 
consider imposing regulations similar to those applicable to the 
National Guard.202 The State Guard Association of the United States 
should also take a more active role in encouraging uniformity in SDF 
training and fitness requirements across states and more national SDF 
training exercises. 
Third, states should invest in public education around SDFs to 
promote recruitment and improve the public’s understanding of the 
program. Because many states do not have SDFs and the SDFs that do 
exist are relatively small, much of the country is unaware of their 
existence. A state militia, in most cases, is seen as a relic of pre-Civil 
War America. The public is likely to embrace SDFs with the 
understanding that they are akin to the National Guard. States should 
 
operations, as appropriate . . . [t]he NG will not spend Federal funds, to include pay and 
allowances, subsistence, transportation, medical care and treatment, or use of Federal equipment 
for activities with the primary purpose of training or otherwise for the support of SDFs . . . .”). 
 200.  Since SDFs operate under state control, federalization of the National Guard resulting 
in a new Federal command structure could cause communication gaps between the two 
organizations. 
 201.  INSPECTOR GEN. DEPT. OF DEF., DODIG-2014-065, EVALUATION OF DEP’T OF 
DEFENSE INTERACTION WITH STATE DEFENSE FORCES 22 (2014), https://media.defense.gov/ 
2014/Apr/30/ 2001713359/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2014-065.pdf. 
 202.  See 32 U.S.C. § 502 (2018) (requiring the National Guard to have drills or instruction 48 
times per year and training at least 15 days per year). 
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also actively try to distance SDFs from the right-wing militia 
movement.203 As such, states may also wish to rename their SDFs to 
reflect the connection to the National Guard, such as the Texas State 
Guard, or to refer to their emergency response role, like State 
Emergency Guard. 
Fourth, SDFs are relatively inexpensive. Since an SDF is a 
volunteer military organization, “[t]here is no general requirement for 
a budget to cover such costs as salaries, facilities, equipment, training, 
travel, and general and administrative expenses. Each state legislature 
determines precisely what will be covered, at what cost, and for how 
long.”204 States should invest more in SDFs to attract qualified 
individuals and provide long-term stability to the organization, such as 
offering incentives to enlist. Texas, for example, offers several benefits, 
including stipends for training and activations, travel allowances during 
activations, free concealed handgun and hunting licenses, waived toll 
road fees, job protections when called to duty, college tuition 
assistance, and paid military leave for state employees.205 
Funding provides an interesting phenomenon with regards to 
natural disaster relief and emergency planning. Response has 
traditionally fallen on local and state governments with the Federal 
government providing support in emergencies or major natural 
disasters.206 Climate change, however, poses serious questions of equity 
in paying for disaster relief. It is the result of years of greenhouse gas 
emissions from all over the world, and all Americans have contributed 
to climate change in some form. This begs the question: should states, 
the Southeast in particular, bear the costs of climate change in the form 
of intensifying hurricanes when South Dakotans, Washingtonians, 
Iowans, and citizens of every other state have exacerbated the problem 
to some degree?207 
 
 203.  Martin Hershkowitz, Homeland Security: The Military’s Confusing Role, 2 STATE DEF. 
FORCE J. 1, 35 (2006) (“SDFs, by their own admission, suffer from the public perception of a 
‘“state militia,’” with all of its anti-government (think ‘“Ruby Ridge’”) connotations. This 
association could create a negative public perception of the Air Force i.e. condoning and 
supporting ultra-conservative groups, without full public understanding of these groups.”). 
 204.  James Carafano et al., supra note 131, at 9. 
 205.  Texas State Guard FAQ, TEXAS MILITARY DEP’T, (last visited Dec. 12, 2018), 
https://tmd.texas.gov/texas-state-guard-faq. 
 206.  See generally Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, supra 
note 57. 
 207.  While most of the U.S. is likely to be financially impacted by climate change in some 
way, the costs of hurricanes to the Southeast are particularly high and are being incurred now. 
The estimated costs of the 2017 major hurricanes, were over 17 times higher than the Camp Fire. 
Compare Office for Coastal Management, Hurricane Costs, NOAA (last modified Mar. 28, 2019), 
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In order to pay for SDFs and other disaster measures, states 
should consider a revenue source that draws from citizens and non-
citizens alike, thereby allocating some of the costs of disaster relief 
generally to out-of-state greenhouse gas emitters. Some possible 
examples include increased tolls or a “tourism tax” on lodging and car 
rentals that would specifically go to funding SDFs. State residents 
should also pay appropriate property taxes or sales taxes to 
compensate for disaster risk. While some states have adopted an 
increased sales tax to pay for conservation and outdoor recreation,208 
states could choose to adopt a similar model dedicated to disaster 
mitigation and management, including SDFs. Some costs could also be 
covered by a similar proposal to H.R. 206 that allowed surplus DoD 
property to be transferred to SDFs.209 
Major disasters spread U.S. military resources thin. Over the 
course of the active 2017 hurricane season, “some 67,000 DoD and 
National Guard personnel responded to help civil authorities.210 In 
October, the Pentagon noted that “new U.S. forces flowing into 
Afghanistan have been delayed due to hurricane relief efforts.”211 A 
recent report by the Heritage Foundation listed Army and Marine 
Corps readiness as “weak” in light of operational demands and a lack 
of funding.212 The Air Force and Navy fared slightly better and received 
 
https://coast.noaa.gov/states/fast-facts/hurricane-costs.html (stating that the major 2017 
hurricanes cost an estimated $226 billion), with CoreLogic, The Camp and Woolsey Wildfires in 
California Cause Devastating Losses Between $15 Billion and $19 Billion According to CoreLogic 
(Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.corelogic.com/news/the-camp-and-woolsey-wildfires-in-california-
cause-devastating-losses-between-15-billion-and-19-billion-according-to-corelogic.aspx?WT. 
mc_id=crlg_181126_hC1gk (estimating $11 to $13 billion in losses from the Camp Fire). The 
EPA estimates that by 2090, extreme temperatures will cost $160 billion dollars in lost wages for 
the entire United States. However, the impacts of extreme temperature will be felt worst in places 
like Florida and Texas which are also the most affected by hurricanes. EPA, MULTI-MODEL 
FRAMEWORK FOR QUANTITATIVE SECTORAL IMPACTS ANALYSIS 54 (2017) (“Loss of labor 
hours across the U.S. is projected to be very costly, totaling over $160 billion in lost wages per 
year by 2090 (range from $87- $220 billion). More than a third of this national loss is projected to 
occur in the Southeast ($47 billion annually).”) 
 208.  William Petroski, Iowa Sales Tax Hike For Outdoors Advances, But Faces Uphill Battle, 
DES MOINES  REG., (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/ 
2015/03/17/iowa-outdoors-natural-tax/24909279/. 
 209.  State Defense Force Improvement Act, supra note 196. 
 210.  Jeff Daniels, From Hurricanes to Fires, 2017 Disasters Tested DoD amid Concern that 
Forces are Stretched Thin, CNBC (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/22/disasters-in-
2017-tested-pentagon-amid-concern-forces-stretched-thin.html. 
 211.  Jeff Daniels, Storm Relief Strains US military as New Report Gives Sober Look at 
Readiness, CNBC (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/05/storm-relief-strains-us-
military-as-heritage-sees-readiness-woes.html. 
 212.  THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 2019 INDEX OF U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH, 
https://www.heritage.org/military-strength (2019). 
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a score of “marginal” in the readiness category.213 Since SDF 
operations are limited to tasks within the United States, robust SDFs 
can take pressure off U.S. military forces to respond to multiple 
disasters and reduce the need for troops that would otherwise be 
engaged in overseas operations. SDFs should work together with DoD 
and the Department of Homeland Security to create guidelines or best 
practices for how to train and integrate SDFs in disaster management. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Climate change is likely worsening the impact of natural disasters 
in the United States, and all levels of government should prepare for a 
Katrina-like catastrophic disaster scenario. Congress should address 
statutory roadblocks to create a streamlined response to catastrophic 
disasters. Federal agencies, including DoD, should establish 
emergency protocols that assess all possible scenarios and provide for 
coordination across emergency groups. States should invest in SDFs 
and strengthen their local response capabilities. 
While the military currently plays a significant role in effectively 
responding to natural disasters, climate change itself requires a 
collaborative and integrated response across all levels and all divisions 
of government. In particular, all levels of government need to address 
one of the fundamental problems underlying disaster planning and 
response—human migration to disaster-prone areas. As climate 
change is increasingly enhancing the strength and frequency of 
hurricanes, floods, and wildfires, people continue to move to the most 
disaster-prone states, like Florida, Texas, and California. 
Local and state governments need to use their police powers to 
move citizens away from risk-prone areas and improve building code 
standards to adjust to a changing climate. Local and state governments 
control zoning ordinances that allow citizens to build in risky areas, 
such as floodplains or coastal areas. Local and state governments can 
also disincentivize building in these high risk areas. 
It is also up to the federal government to adopt legislation to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and tackle climate change. Effective 
legislation could mitigate climate change impacts that are already being 
felt in the United States and reduce future damage. It is up to 
policymakers to ease the burden of disaster relief by directly 
confronting climate change and gradually moving people and property 
 
 213.  Id. 
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out of high-risk areas. The less people and property are impacted, the 
less need for a military response. 
 
